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Introduction 
This article offers some ideas about a system of governance 
which reflects the reality of planetary boundaries (Rockström 
et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2015). The goal of living safely 
within the boundaries of our planet cannot be achieved by 
relying on traditional forms of governance based on the 
concept of sovereign nation states. States, driven by national 
interest, have been resistant to accepting responsibility for 
areas beyond national jurisdiction known as the global 
commons (Ostrom, 1990). The focus for governing the global 
commons – the polar regions, oceans, atmosphere, outer 
space – needs to shift from states to Earth as a whole, evoking 
what might be called ‘Earth governance’ (Bosselmann, 2015).
Hence, consensus-building ultimately 
resides with citizens, not with 
governments. It is appropriate, therefore, 
to perceive of governments as trustees 
acting for, and on behalf of, citizens as 
beneficiaries (ibid., pp.155-97). In the 
Anthropocene, citizenship has ecological 
and global dimensions (ibid., pp.42-45). 
This calls for transnational processes of 
forming the collective will. In this way 
we can perceive Earth, not states, as the 
common reference point, enabling us to 
develop a strong sense of stewardship, or 
guardianship, for the global commons. 
This reasoning makes the case that states 
can, and must, accept fiduciary duties for 
the global commons.
Reclaiming Earth: the global commons
Currently, the atmosphere is being treated 
as an open-access resource without any 
legal status: it is widely regarded as ius 
nullius, a legal nullity. This works for 
property owners, who fill the vacuum 
by exercising their property rights. Such 
rights may not include a right to pollute, 
but the absence of someone who could 
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claim violation of their own rights means 
that actual pollution goes without any 
sanction. In fact, it is free. This will be 
qualified only when the law sets rights-
limiting emissions standards. To date this 
has been an uphill battle, which has not 
been made easier merely by having the 
Paris Agreement. By asserting that we all 
own the atmosphere, we begin to use the 
institutions of law working in our favour. 
As legal owners we can charge for damage 
to our common property, provide rewards 
to those who protect it (e.g. producers and 
users of renewable energy) and in this way 
eliminate greenhouse gases. 
This could be supported by the public 
trust doctrine – that natural commons 
should be held in trust, since assets serve 
the public good. It is the responsibility 
of the government, as trustee, to protect 
these assets from harm and ensure their 
use for the public and future generations. 
Nationally, the government would act 
as an environmental trustee, while 
internationally states would jointly act 
as trustees for the global commons, such 
as the atmosphere. Considering that 
only about 90 companies are responsible 
for two thirds of carbons emitted into 
the atmosphere, a global trusteeship 
institution could quickly fix the problem 
of climate change (Costanza, 2015). 
The idea of global nature trusts has 
been promoted by environmental lawyers 
Mary Wood and Peter Sand, as well as 
economist Peter Barnes (Wood, 2007, 
2013; Sand, 2004, 2013, 2014; Barnes, 
2001, 2006). Recently, the global petition 
Claim the Sky was launched by Robert 
Costanza with support from the Club 
of Rome.1 Trusteeship governance is 
also advocated by the rich literature on 
the commons (e.g. Bollier, 2014; Bollier 
and Weston, 2013; Helfrich and Haas, 
2009; Ostrom, 1990). The ‘reclaiming the 
commons’ movement has certainly found 
a new momentum in recent times. 
International law and the United 
Nations are not only needed, but 
practically ready to develop institutions 
of trusteeship governance. There is, for 
example, a tradition of UN institutions 
with a trusteeship mandate, including the 
(now retired) UN Trusteeship Council, 
the World Health Organization with 
respect to public health, and, ironically, 
also the World Trade Organization with 
respect to free trade (Bosselmann, 2015, 
pp.198-232). A number of other UN 
or UN-related institutions with weaker 
trusteeship functions exist as well (ibid., 
p.206). Quite obviously, states have been 
capable of, expressively or implicitly, 
creating international trusteeship 
institutions. These developments – and in 
particular the existence of supranational 
organisations such as the European 
Union – demonstrate that sovereignty of 
states can be transferred to international 
levels. 
The underpinning motives are not 
so much of a particular legal nature, 
but rather driven more by politics. And 
politics is driven by morality that presently 
favours exploitation. But morality can be 
subject to change. By insisting on the 
common good, civil society can reclaim 
lost ground and rebuild democracy. 
Trusteeship governance should be seen as 
a joint effort of the UN, states and civil 
society organisations with an equal say in 
decision making.
Sovereignty and trusteeship
There is, at present, an alliance between 
politics (‘sovereignty’) and private 
interests (‘property’) which can 
undermine the democratic process and 
public concern for safeguarding the 
global commons. As Barnes points out, 
‘[n]ot even seated at democracy’s table 
– not organised, not propertied, and not 
enfranchised – are future generations, 
ecosystems, and nonhuman species’ 
(Barnes, 2006, p38).
The practice of state governance 
in recent decades has affected how 
environmental policies and laws are 
being conceived. Mary Wood calls this 
a ‘discretionary frame’, which means 
that governments see themselves as 
perfectly entitled to give priority to 
short-term resource exploitation over 
long-term resource conservation (Wood, 
2013, p.592). Environmental commons 
are perceived as ‘government-owned’, 
but not with any concern for future 
generations, nonhuman species, or even 
the contemporary citizen (Barnes, 2006, 
p.43). It is clear that governance today 
is about a quid pro quo, symbiotic 
relationship between political institutions 
and corporations (ibid., p.37). The 
rewards for the latter include property 
rights, friendly regulators, subsidies, tax 
breaks, and free or inexpensive use of the 
commons. This means little is left for the 
‘common’ good. 
Fundamentally, the legitimacy of the 
state rests on its function to act for, and 
on behalf of, its citizens. This requires 
consent of the governed.2 Governmental 
duties can therefore be understood as 
fiduciary obligations towards citizens 
(Fox-Decent, 2012; Frankel, 1983). Such 
fiduciary obligations are recognised 
typically in public law.3 They exist in 
common law and civil law (although in 
varying forms and degrees), 4 and are also 
known in international law (Blumm and 
Guthrie, 2012; Perritt, 2004; Brown Weiss, 
1984). The fiduciary function of the state 
can also be described as a trusteeship 
function (Finn, 1995). 
Let us, therefore, examine how state 
sovereignty can be reconciled with 
trusteeship. Prima facie both seem to 
have different purposes. Yet they are part 
of the same basic function of the state, 
which is to serve the citizens on whom it 
depends and to whom it is accountable. 
The environmental crisis and the 
state of the global commons gives rise to 
the need for revisiting the relationship 
between sovereignty and trusteeship 
(Stec, 2010, pp.361, 378-80, 384-85). 
The practice of state governance in 
recent decades has affected how 
environmental policies and laws are 
being conceived.
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Trusteeship must be pursued at both 
the international level and the domestic, 
internal level. As Benvenisti notes, 
the private, self-contained concept of 
sovereignty is less compelling than it was 
in the past because of the ‘glaring misfit 
between the scope of the sovereign’s 
authority and the sphere of the affected 
stakeholders’. This engenders inefficient, 
undemocratic and unjust outcomes 
for under- or unrepresented affected 
stakeholders (Benvenisti, 2013, pp.295, 
301). Non-citizens, future generations 
and the natural environment all fall into 
this category.
There are two challenges to advancing 
the idea of trusteeship, and both boil 
down to sovereignty. On the one hand, 
to propose a system of international 
trusteeship is to directly challenge the 
principle of non-interference in the 
domestic affairs of states. To propose 
that states become trustees themselves, 
in addition to an international system of 
trusteeship, is, again, an intrusion into 
their sovereign right to determine their 
approach to the environment. However, 
without the latter we will not achieve the 
former. Regardless of what one thinks 
about the legitimacy of sovereignty and 
the entire make-up of international 
relations, the reality is that states call 
the shots. Unless there is a radical 
reorganisation of global politics, we need 
to work within the state-centric context.
Trusteeship is an idea which softens 
the blow of what would otherwise be 
seen as an unprecedented intrusion into 
sovereign state affairs. This is a type of 
intervention that was not envisaged in the 
UN Charter, but is nonetheless desirable 
and legitimate (Bantekas, 2009, p.19). As 
Redgwell explains, ‘trust arrangements 
do not challenge sovereignty directly, 
for one of the advantages of trusteeship 
arrangements is the absence of sovereignty 
in the exercise of trusteeship functions – 
there is no transfer of sovereignty to the 
trust authority’ (Redgwell, 2005, p.179).
But what if trust arrangements were 
perceived as a significant intrusion into 
sovereignty? The many proposals of 
trusteeship arrangements at the level 
of the UN have been, more often than 
not, greeted with hostility. States seem 
too attached to the principle of non-
interference to appreciate cooperation 
of this kind. Yet the very origins of the 
concept of state sovereignty are closely 
linked with humanitarian concerns. The 
Peace of Westphalia, as the foundation of 
state sovereignty, was a key instrument 
for upholding humanitarian precepts 
relating to freedom of conscience and 
religion (Stec, 2010, pp.378-80). To the 
extent that it resolved a crisis of freedom 
of conscience and equality before the 
law and many pre-existing institutions 
had lost their legitimacy and ultimately 
collapsed, sovereignty has been and 
can be justified. But it should also be 
remembered that humanitarian concerns 
were at the root of the crisis that the new 
order resolved. Where new crises emerge, 
can the principle of non-interference 
really be justified?
Similarly, with regard to the state 
itself as environmental trustee for those 
over whom it governs, it could hardly 
be refuted that a democratically elected 
government does not owe its citizens 
a duty to govern their natural wealth 
and resources in a sustainable way.5 The 
first step, then, is reminding ourselves, 
as citizens and society, that these rights 
and responsibilities rest with us, despite 
the state acting as our representative. 
The second step is convincing the 
consumer society of what these rights 
and responsibilities entail. This is no 
small feat.
Fiduciary duties of the state
The only way to turn things around 
and move international law from the 
Westphalian conflict model to a 21st-
century cooperation model is to redefine 
states as trusteeship organisations. 
Sovereignty and trusteeship must be 
seen as complementary, not mutually 
exclusive. The argument in favour of states 
as trustees proceeds along the following 
lines.
The state gains its legitimacy 
exclusively from the people who created 
it. While the legality of a state depends 
on recognition by other states, once in 
existence a state can only ever legitimise 
its continued existence through ongoing 
trust by its people. The core idea of the 
modern democratic state is that it acts 
through its people, by its people and 
for its people. This implies a fiduciary 
relationship between citizen and state 
and is arguably the only legitimate 
basis for political authority (Reisman, 
1990). It is echoed in constitutional 
documents such as the 1776 Pennsylvania 
Declaration of Rights: ‘[A]ll power being 
. . . derived from the people; therefore 
all officers of government, whether 
legislative or executive, are their trustees 
and servants, and at all times accountable 
to them’ (Criddle and Fox-Decent, 2009; 
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, 
article 1). Locke asserted that legislative 
power is ‘only a fiduciary power to act for 
certain ends’ and that ‘there remains still 
in the people a supreme power to remove 
or alter the legislature when they find the 
legislative act to be contrary to the trust 
reposed in them’.
Kant drew the moral basis of fiduciary 
obligations from the duty-bound 
relationship between parents and children 
(Criddle and Fox-Decent, 2009, p.352). 
Children have an innate and legal right 
to their parents’ care. State legitimacy is 
the result of a contract necessarily created 
between people to form Rousseau’s 
‘general will’. Through this process, Kant 
claimed, we jointly authorise the state to 
announce and enforce law.
The only way to turn things around 
and move international law from the 
Westphalian conflict model to a 21st-
century cooperation model is to redefine 
states as trusteeship organisations.
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That state sovereignty is 
fundamentally a trust relationship cannot 
be dismissed as a Western ideal. Trusts 
and the implicit fiduciary relationship 
are traced back to Middle Eastern origins 
and Roman and Germanic law, as well 
as being inherent in religious teachings. 
The idea is perhaps even more prevalent 
in non-Western societies because they 
emphasise collective identity (family, 
clan, nation, religion) over individual 
freedom and dignity, imbuing implied 
fiduciary obligations into the structure of 
public and private legal institutions (ibid., 
pp.378-79). The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights states that ‘the will of the 
people shall be the basis of the authority 
of government’.6 
So, although we may have democracy 
(and many places do not) in a technical 
sense, we have lost sight of what duty the 
state owes to those it governs. At its most 
simplistic, the state’s legitimacy to govern 
is based on its ability to serve the common 
interest. Aristotle saw the purpose of the 
state as for the ‘common good’. Locke 
hinted at such a purpose. But who 
defines common good and what does it 
include? According to Locke’s definition, 
the common good was what arose from 
there being surplus produce that could 
be sold in the marketplace. The common 
good is ‘a quantifiable one, not a moral 
one. From this concept of quantity would 
flow the modern measure of the common 
good – the Gross Domestic Product – a 
poor measure of any society’s real quality 
of life’ (Collins, 2008, p.455). But because 
‘common interests’ are socially conceived, 
they are not static and can be contested; 
we can argue that new functions and 
responsibilities ought to become a part 
of the state’s mandate to govern.
We have seen that government 
perceives its role largely as a facilitator 
of economic growth, seen as analogous 
to ‘prosperity’, and thus the protector 
of private property (ibid.); that is, the 
belief that allowing individuals to pursue 
their own interests will result in the 
best possible social organisation. Few 
governments could argue that they do not 
owe a fiduciary duty to their constituents. 
Indeed, now more than ever governments 
are scrambling to reduce deficits in order 
to fulfil their obligation to the public not 
to overspend. The problem is that states 
have neglected the ecological aspects of 
their fiduciary duty. And we, as the voting 
public, have let them.
Benvenisti conceives of three other 
normative bases according to which we 
should ascribe a trusteeship function to 
states’ mandate to govern. The first two 
grounds lend themselves most easily to 
the development of rights and obligations 
under a conception of state trusteeship 
limited to intra-generational concerns. 
A normative approach which grounds 
itself in global resource distribution may 
be more conducive to the realisation of 
state trusteeship according to principles 
of inter-generational equity.7 
First, sovereignty should be viewed 
as a vehicle for the exercise of personal 
and collective self-determination 
(Benvenisti, 2013, p.301). Collective self-
determination embodies the freedom 
of a group to pursue its interests to 
further its political status, and ‘freely 
dispose of [its] natural wealth and 
resources’.8 Second, Benvenisti refers to a 
conception of sovereign states as agents 
of humanity as a whole (ibid., p.305). 
He bases this conception largely on the 
equal moral worth of all human beings9 
and the corresponding foundation of 
international law in human rights. He 
argues that it is humanity at large that 
assigns to certain groups of citizens the 
power to form national governments. 
Accordingly, states can and should be 
viewed as agents of a global system 
that allocates competences and 
responsibilities for the promotion of 
the rights of all human beings and their 
interest in the sustainable utilisation of 
global resources (ibid., pp.306, 308).10 
As such, the corollary of state authority 
to manage public affairs within domestic 
jurisdictions is an obligation to take 
account of external interests and balance 
internal against external interests.11
The privilege of territorial sovereignty 
can, then, be legitimised only in so far 
as the universal interests of humanity as 
a whole are not severely affected. This 
argument is based not only on ecological 
realities defying national state boundaries, 
but also on the observation that 
boundaries of states do not necessarily 
coincide with boundaries of nationalities, 
or of those groups whose members share 
a distinct interest in, and conception of, 
the common good (Gans, 2003).
For Benvenisti, sovereignty is the power 
to exclude portions of global resources. 
Both ownership and sovereignty are 
claims for the intervention in the state of 
nature by carving out valuable space for 
exclusive use (Benvenisti, 2013, p.308). 
Such a perception of states as power-
wielding property owners provides a solid 
normative foundation for the imposition 
of a positive obligation on states to take 
other-regarding considerations into 
account when managing the resources 
assigned to them (ibid., pp.309, 310).12 
Property law theory can thus provide us 
with a framework within which we can 
translate these moral grounds into legal 
obligations (Bosselmann, 2011). Thus, we 
should conceptualise ownership of global 
resources as originating from a collective 
regulatory decision at the global level, 
rather than as an entitlement of sovereign 
states (Benvenisti, 2013, p.309).
Conclusion
Global commons governance reverses the 
traditional rule that international law and 
governance ends where national borders 
begin. The dichotomy between national 
law and international law defies ecological 
reality. States need to exempt transnational 
ecological aspects from the concept of 
States need to exempt transnational 
ecological aspects from the concept of 
exclusive territorial sovereignty, making 
way for global commons governance.
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exclusive territorial sovereignty, making 
way for global commons governance. 
Through environmental trusteeship at 
the state level, territorial sovereignty 
is conceptually restricted at the global 
level, leading to a paradigm shift in 
international environmental law. Instead 
of state sovereignty setting limits to 
environmental protection, environmental 
protection would set the limits to state 
sovereignty. Indeed, ‘limiting the self-
interest of states by taking into account 
global concerns of humanity has become 
a fundamental aspect of international law’ 
(Stec, 2010, p.364). 
States are as yet unable to resist the 
global market. Its forces have heavily 
eroded state sovereignty – the same state 
sovereignty required to resist its complete 
dominance. The paradox of surrendering 
sovereignty to free trade and market forces 
on the one hand, and on the other hand 
insisting on sovereignty when expected to 
protect the commons has been described 
as the ‘sovereignty paradox’ (Zaum, 
2007, pp.226-31; Kaul, 2013). The way 
out of the paradox is differentiation: 
more sovereignty where possible; 
less sovereignty where necessary. In a 
globalised world this means protecting 
citizens and the environment from global 
economic forces (‘more sovereignty’) 
and protecting the global commons 
through international rules controlling 
financial and economic markets (‘less 
sovereignty’). The perspective of 
differentiated sovereignty, also referred 
to as ‘responsible sovereignty’, calls for 
reforming and strengthening global 
institutions  (Kaul, 2013). Nothing is 
more urgent than matching political 
institutions to the global challenges we 
face.
Concern for the global commons 
is a unifying feature of humanity. If we 
see ourselves as stewards of Earth, with 
states acting as trustees of the common 
good, a crucial step will be taken towards 
Earth governance – perhaps then, more 
appropriately, called Earth democracy 
(Bosselmann, 2010).
1 https://secure.avaaz.org/en/petition/Claim_the_Sky/?pv=58.
2 ‘[G]overnment is not legitimate unless it is carried on with 
the consent of the governed’: quoted in Ashcraft (1991), 
p.524. 
3 Including constitutional law, administrative law, tax law, 
criminal law and environmental law.
4 For example, the United States, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand recognise them with respect to indigenous peoples, 
ratepayers and (with the exception of New Zealand) in the 
form of public trusts, whereas continental European countries 
more fundamentally rely on public law to assume fiduciary 
relationships between individuals and governments.
5 See, for example, the Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources (1962), UN General Assembly 
resolution 1803 (XVII) [1].
6 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN General 
Assembly resolution 217 A(III) (adopted 10 December 
1948), article 21(3).
7 As initially expounded by Brown Weiss (1984). 
8 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 
UNTS 171 (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 
23 March 1976), article 1. 
9 Referring to John Stewart Mill, Considerations on 
Representative Government, 1861.
10 Paraphrasing Huber (1928) in Island of Palmas (Netherlands 
v United States), RIAA 829, 869.
11 Paraphrasing Huber in British Claims in the Spanish Zone 
of Morocco (Spain v United Kingdom) (1925), 2 RIAA 615, 
641.
12 Also when making rival claims on transboundary and public 
resources.
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